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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(j), (1996) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues for this court to review are (1) whether the lower court abused its discretion by 
granting the Motion to Strike Defendants' December 13, 1999, affidavit (Preserved at R. 284-291), 
and (2) whether the lower court erred in its conclusion of law in granting summary judgment to the 
Plaintiff (Preserved at Id.). 
1. Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review. 
The standard of review is "abuse-of-discretion." 
The abuse-of-discretion standard flows from the trial court's significant role in pre-appellate 
litigation. The trial court has "a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair and efficient manner 
to conduct business." Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997). This is 
because "[t]he trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the status of his cases, as well as the 
attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties " Id. 
Until an appellate court has determined that a particular fact situation does or does not satisfy 
the legal standard at issue, the trial court has discretion to venture into that area and to make that 
determination See State v. Peiia, 869 P 2d at 939-40 (Utah 1994) A trial court abuses its discretion 
if there is "no reasonable basis for the decision " Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P 2d 937,938 
(Utah 1993) A trial judge's determination should be reversed if the ailing "is so unreasonable that 
it can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion "Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 860 P.2d 937,938 (Utah 1993). 
As for Rule 37 sanctions, a trial court has broad discretion to select and impose sanctions for 
discovery violations See Penningtwn v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P 2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998) Tuck v 
Godfrey, 367 Utah Adv Rep 42, 43 (Utah Ct App 1999) An appellate court ""will find that a trial 
court has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if there is either an 
'erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling "' Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P 2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) 
2 Correctness Standard of Review 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the 
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below And in determining whether those facts 
require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party below, the appellate court 
gives no deference to the trial court's conclusion of law, which are reviewed for correctness Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P 2d 634 (Utah 1989) 
Legal determinations are defined as "those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules 
or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status m similar circumstances " 
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State v. Perm, 869 P.2d at 935 (Utah 1994) Ci[A]ppellate review of a trial court's determination of 
the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness '" Id. at 936; accord Drake v. Industral 
Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997), Stanglv. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) 'Utah case law teaches that "correctness* means the appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." Pena, 869 
P.2d at 935. Thus the broadest scope of judicial review extends to questions of law "This is because 
appellate courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and 
to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 
On appeal, the question of whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of 
law. See Gerbich v. Named Inc., 911 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999), Coulter & Smith v. Russell, 976 
P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, 
[appellate courts] give the trial court's legal conclusions no particular deference " Mast v. Overton, 
971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES ETC 
The applicable Rules determinative of the propriety of the lower court's ruling are Rules 37 
and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about February 6, 2001, Judge William A. Thorne of the Third District Court signed 
the Order Granting a Motion to Strike an affidavit filed by the Appellants in response to a previously 
unsuccessful Summary Judgment motion filed by the Appellee. The order also declared Admitted 
Request for Admissions, granted Rule 37 Sanctions and granted Summary Judgment for the Appellee. 
R. 315-317. Appellants now appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Appellee, BMC West Corporation, Filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court 
on or about April 23, 1999, and served the same with Summons on Appellants on May 19, 1999. R. 
1-3. Appellants filed an Answer to the Complaint on or about June 10, 1999. R. 10-13. 
2. Appellee, BMC West Corporation, propounded Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents to Appellants, Desert Crest Development, Inc , and Jessica Barker, on or 
about the 15th day of June, 1999. R. 13-22. On or about August 12, 1999, BMC West Corporation 
filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions and Request for Expedited Decision. R. 26-27. The 
Motion to Compel and for Sanctions was granted on October 7, 1999. R. 43. However, Appellants 
were not made aware of the particulars of the order nor were they furnished a signed copy of the 
order until January 3, 2000. R. 193. 
3. On or about the 15th day of October, 1999, Appellants, responded to Appellee's First Set 
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. R. 45, 154-164 
4. On or about the 30th day of November, 1999, BMC West Corporation filed its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. R. 143. On or about the 13th day of December, 1999, Appellants filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment supported by an Affidavit of 
Jessica Barker. R. 168-180. 
5. On or about the 28th day of December, 1999, BMC West Corporation filed its Reply 
Memorandum in Support for Summary Judgment, together with a Notice to Submit for Decision. R. 
148-166. The Motion for Summary Judgment was denied on February 4, 2000. R. 183. 
6. On or about the 16th day of February, 2000, BMC West Corporation filed a Motion for 
Rule 37 Sanctions, together with a Memorandum in Support of the Motion. R. 185, 187-190. On or 
4 
about the 3rd day of March, 2000, Appellants filed a Response to Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions R 
191-195 
7 On or about the 10th day of February, 2000, BMC West Corporation propounded its 
Second Set of Interrogatories, Request for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents 
to Appellants R 207-209 
8 On or about March 21, 2000, BMC West Corporation filed its Reply Memorandum in 
Support of the Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions R 191-195 
9. On August 29, 2000, Appellee took the deposition of Jessica Barker R 221-222, 240-
280 Appellee requested the deposition of Ben Mangelsen, husband to Jessica Barker and former 
employee of Desert Crest Development, Inc R 229-230 Mr Mangelson is a key witness as to the 
disputed facts of this case R 281-283 
10 On or about November 22, 2000, BMC West Corporation filed its Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, for Rule 37 
Sanctions and for Summary Judgment R 227-280 On or about December 15,2000, Appellants filed 
a Response to the Motion to Strike AjBSdavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, for Rule 
37 Sanctions and for Summary Judgment R 284-290 Jessica Barker also executed an Affidavit in 
support of her Response to Motion to Strike Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, 
for Rule 37 Sanctions and for Summary Judgment R 281-283 
11 On or about December 26, 2000, BMC West Corporation filed its Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, for Rule 37 
Sanctions and for Summary Judgment R 292-299 
12 On or about February 6, 2001. the Court signed the Order Granting the Motion to Strike 
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Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, for Rule 37 Sanctions and for Summarv 
Judgment. R. 315-317. 
13 Appellants now appeal the Order of the Trial Court granting the Motion to Strike 
Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, for Rule 37 Sanctions and for Summary 
Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellants' December 13, 1999 Affidavits. The 
trial court also erred in its conclusion of law that Appellee was entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
JESSICA BARKER. 
By granting the Motion to Strike Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, for 
Rule 37 Sanctions and for Summary Judgment, the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court 
based the order to strike the affidavit upon the notion that the Appellants were in violation of the 
October 7, 1999 order, which reads in relevant part, "The Court orders that Defendants are estopped 
from denying the completeness of their responses, and from offering any evidence requested in the 
discovery and not produced in Defendants' responses." R. 43. 
The information Appellants provided in their affidavit was also provided to Appellee in the 
form of answers to Appellee's first set of Interrogatories. Therefore, it was unreasonable for the trial 
court to interpret Appellants' December 13, 1999, affidavit as not complying with the Octobei 7, 
6 
1999, order. 
"Before a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under Rule 37, the court must find on 
the part of the noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith, or fault " Morton v. Continental Baking 
Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). Appellants did not submit the December 13, 1999, affidaxit in 
bad faith, nor with fault or willfulness to disobey the trial court's order of sanctions. 
Furthermore, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to submit 
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Appellants' December 13, 1999, affidavit 
was submitted in conjunction with Appellants' Memorandum in Response to Appellee's November 
30, 1999, Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Because the affidavit was arguably in accordance with the court order and because submitting 
an affidavit to counter a motion for summary judgment is permitted by Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning Appellants in such a heavily 
prejudicial fashion. The December 13, 1999, Affidavit should not have been stricken as a sanction 
against Appellants for not adhering to the October 7, 1999, order. 
POINT II 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE APPELLEE 
WAS ERRONEOUS 
Though the Appellee was successful in persuading the trial court to strike Appellant's 
December 13, 1999, affidavit which clearly sets forth the disputed facts of the case, and to declare 
admitted request for admissions, the trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment for the Appellee 
because even absent the affidavit, Appellants gave ample showing, through answers to 
interrogatories, pleadings, and depositions, that genuine issues of material fact existed. See R. 168-
7 
174 In Hatch v. Sugarhouse Fin. Co ,20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P 2d 758 (1967), the Supreme Court 
found that summary judgment was erroneously entered for plaintiff where an issue of fact was raised 
by the pleadings and counter-affidavit of defendant Such is the present case 
Summary judgment should not be granted unless the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and 
affidavits in a case show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the summary judgment tool is not used to trv an issue of 
fact, but rather to determine whether one exists, hence, if all the evidence is viewed most favorably 
for the nonmovant and facts are present upon which reasonable persons could disagree or if they lead 
to inferences that can be fairly drawn and present different conclusions, then summary judgment 
should not be granted Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P 2d 909 (1960), Krantz v Holt, 
819 P 2d 352 (Utah 1991), Billings v. Union Bankers Ins Co , 819 P 2d 803 (Utah 1991) 
If there is any issue as to any material fact, a motion for summary judgment should be denied 
Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P 2d 862, cert denied, 344 U S 886, (1952), Ruffingengo v. 
Miller, 579 P 2d 342 (Utah 1978) In Appellant's successful December 13, 1999, Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, Appellants set forth a list of six material facts in dispute, three of 
which are supported by Appellants' answers to Interrogatories R 168-169 
In its Order granting Summary Judgment, the trial court stated, " the Court having reviewed 
the memoranda, affidavits, and other papers of the parties, being fully informed and in good cause 
appearing, finds [Appellee's] motion has merit" However, more than "merit" is required as a matter 
of law in ruling in favor of summary judgment In this, the trial court erred In determining whether 
to grant summary judgment the trial court is required to view the evidence most favorable to the 
nonmoving party 
8 
Furthermore, summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete, since 
information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the 
motion. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (1987). In the present case, discovery was not complete. Ben Mangelson, a key witness to the 
disputed facts, was preparing to be deposed by the Appellee. 
Because material issues of disputed facts exist in this case, was the trial court's decision to 
grant summary judgment erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented heretofore, the Appellants pray this Court overturn the decision of 
the trial court granting the Motion to Strike Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Request for Admissions, 
for Rule 37 Sanctions and for Summary Judgment. The Appellants move this court to remand this 
case back to the trial court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2001. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT& ESPLIN 
9-, 
GARVH. WEIGHT / 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 37 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
10 
109 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RuleS? 
Punitive damages. by the father that the child would not return to 
Where plaintiff requests an admission of pu- his home regardless of whether he was founcTto 
nitive damages in an amount unrelated to have abused the child Therefore, the admis^ 
actual damages, the court as a matter of eq- sions did not directly jeopardize a Droper deter-
uit> must intervene and examine the admis- mination of the child's best interests State, Ehv 
sion Jensen v Pioneer Dodge Ctr, Inc , 702 of Child & Family Servs v N R., 2000 UT App 
P2d 98 (Utah 1985) 143 2 P3d 948 
Withdrawal of admissions. Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corpok 
A finding of prejudice, and consequent re- Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151* 379, 
fusal to permit withdrawal of admissions, was P2d 379 (1963), W W & W B Gardne^ Inc. vf 
not an abuse of the trial court's discretion Park W Village, Inc , 568 P 2d 734 (Utah 1977); 
wnere the circumstances included a concession In re Pendleton 2000 UT 77 11 P3d 284 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- rules, to respond to request for admission*bf 
dence 1983 — Part m , 1995 Utah L. Rev 683 facts not within his personal knowledge,1^ 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am Jur 2d Depositions A.L.R.3d 756 
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325 Formal sufficiency of response to request'for 
C.J.S. — 27 C J S Discovery §§ 88 to 110 admissions under state discovery rules, 8 
AXJL — Continuance sought to secure tes- A.LJR.4th 728 
timony of absent witness in^ civil case, admis- Permissible scope, respecting nature of in-
*ions to prevent, lo AL R 3d 12/2
 o f d e m a n d f o r admissions under modern 
Parj, s duty under Federal Rule of Civil
 g t a t e ^ ^ o f p r o c e d u r e 4 2 A.L R 4th 489 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to 
other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court An application for an order to a party may be made to 
the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, 
to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken An application 
for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the 
district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. 
(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other 
party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. 'Tlie 
motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred 
or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an efibrf to 
secure the disclosure without court action. 
(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under 
Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted 
under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted 
under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested 
or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for 
an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling^ 
inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include a certifif 
cation that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with? 
the person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the-
information or material without court action. When taking a deposition on oraT 
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the 
examination before applying for an order. 
(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of 
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to 
be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is 
provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after opportunity for 
Rule 37 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 110 
hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion 
or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the 
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, includ-
ing attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the 
movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery 
without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or 
objection was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an 
award of expenses unjust. 
(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order 
authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for hearing, require 
the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to 
the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses 
incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter 
any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after opportunity 
for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent 
fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the 
court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be 
considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, 
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide 
or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule 
or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b), the 
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any 
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the 
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated 
matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order 
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order 
to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), such 
orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply is unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney or both of them to pay 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of 
any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the 
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may 
apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable 
I l l UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 37 
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. 
The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held 
objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no 
substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground 
to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good 
reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrog-
atories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take 
the deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers 
or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service 
of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for 
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the 
court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized 
under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of 
any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act 
or the party's attorney or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act 
has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or 
attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by 
agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for 
hearing, require such party or attorney to pay to any other party the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), that party shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing 
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order 
any other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, 
any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury 
of the failure to disclose. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1999; November 1, 2000.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — For a com-
plete explanation of the 1999 amendments to 
this rule and the interrelationship of these 
amendments with the other discovery changes, 
see the advisory committee note appended to 
Rule 26. The Supreme Court order approving 
the amendments directed that the new proce-
dures be applicable only to cases filed on or 
after November 1, 1999. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1999 amend-
ment substituted "Rule 16(b)" for "Rule 26(f)* in 
Subdivision (bX2); in Subdivision (bX2XE) de-
leted "requiring him to produce another for 
examination" after "Rule 35(a)" and "shows that 
he" after "failing to comply"; substituted "par-
ty's attorney" for "attorney advising him" in the 
third sentence of Subdivision (d); added Subdi-
vision (f); and made stylistic and gender neu-
tral changes throughout the rule. 
The 2000 amendment added Subdivision 
(aX2XA); redesignated existing Subdivision 
(aX2) as (a)(2XB), adding the second sentence 
and deleting a provision authorizing protective 
orders after denial of the motion; added refer-
ences to disclosure and response to Subdivision 
(aX3); in Subdivision (aX4), added "and sanc-
tions" to the heading, added the provisions in 
Subdivision (aX4XA) regarding post-motion 
compliance and court findings on good faith 
efforts, added provisions authorizing protective 
orders to Subdivisions (a)(4XB) and (C), and 
inserted "after opportunity for a hearing" in 
Subdivision (aX4XO; added "or Rule 26(eXD" 
in Subdivision (f); and made stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References- — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-32-1 et seq. 
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Opening default or default judgment claimed custom, 28 A L.R.3d 1383 
to have been obtained because of attorney's Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, pretrial conference, 55 A-L.R.3d 303 
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A-L.R.3d 1255 Default judgments against the United States 
Failure to give notice of application for de- under Rule 55^e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
fault judgment where notice is required only by Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed 190 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
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presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, *the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused himTta 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any oflFending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, in Subdivision (c), substituted the first 
sentence for the former first sentence which 
read "The motion shall be served at least 10 
days before the time* fixed for the 116*1^^; 
deleted the former second sentence which read 
"The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposmg affidavits*", and deleted 
"forthwith" following "rendered** m the present 
second sentence. 
Compiler's Notes, — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References, — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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Specific facts are required to show whether 
then* is-genuine issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor 
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When a motion for summary judgment is 
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COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k) 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" m Subsection (2Xh) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4) 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
ANALYSIS 
Decisions of Board of Pardons 
Extraordinary writs 
Final order 
Habeas corpus proceedings 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope 
— Sentence reduction 
Cited 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, ex-
cept when the petition additionally challenges 
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree 
felony or a capital felony Then the appeal is to 
be heard by the Supreme Court Preece v 
House, 886 P2d 508 'Utah 1994) 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2)(a) 
The 1996 amendment by ch 159, effective 
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sover-
eign Lands and Forestry" m Subsection (2)(a) 
The 1996 amendment by ch 198, effective 
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d), 
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesig-
nated former Subsections (2He) to (2)(k) as 
(2Xd) to (2)(j) 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,39-6-16 
Extraordinary writs. 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a 
petition for a writ of mandamus directed 
against a judge of the district court based on its 
authority under this section to enforce compli-
ance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid 
of its appellate jurisdiction Barnard v Murphy, 
882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds noth-
ing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — 
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — 
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraor-
dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's juris-
diction to consider a petition onginally filed 
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that originated elsewhere Barnard 
v Murphy, 882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
Because, under this section, the Court of 
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